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Using mainly archival data, this paper examines the nature and 
causes of Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) to China 
and theorizes it with inductive arguments. It proceeds as fol-
lows.  After a brief introduction on China’s robustness in the 
global investment market, it introduces the position of Japan 
as investor in this country, and proceeds with an examination 
of the major theories of FDI.  It then examines the underly-
ing causes of Japanese FDI to China in view of those theories.  
The paper concludes that, in addition to many investment-al-
luring incentives, most prominently China over time has in-
fused, fostered, created, and nurtured numerous competitive 
advantages (pull-factors) within its investment proliferating 
environment, which ultimately ushered FDI from Japan to it.  
Domestic factors as well as global investment competitors drive 
(push-factors) toward China further induced Japanese multi-
national corporations (MNCs) to boost investment into China.
Introduction
	
From its centrally planned economic system (1949-1978), transition to market 
economic mechanisms in China started since 1978 with the introduction of major 
economic	policy-reforms	and	open-market	strategies	under	the	leadership	of	Deng	
Xiaoping.  Establishment of the special economic zones (SEZs) in the coastal re-
gion	of	Guangdong	province	was	 the	milestone	in	 its	economic	relations	policy,	
which	heralded	the	advent	of	a	new	era	of	embracing	foreign	capital,	technology,	
and	business	management.	 	 In	 the	initial	stage	of	reform	and	transition	(1979	to	
1985), it received foreign funds mostly in development projects, and investments 
in	business	ventures	were	mostly	with	the	state	owned	enterprises	(SOEs)	and	to	
some extent in Greenfield sectors. Outside Chinese populated regions/ territories, 
the	sources	of	such	investments	and	development	funds	were	the	World	Bank,	the	
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International Monetary Fund (IMF), governments of Japan, the United States of 
America (USA), the United Kingdom (UK), Italy, Germany, Singapore, and Aus-
tralia,	and	private	business	companies	mostly	from	these	countries.		This	amounted	
to $1.2 billion, $0.9 billion, $1.4 billion, and $2.0 billion respectively, in 1979-82, 
1983, 1984, and 1985.  The actual take-off of foreign direct investment (FDI) took 
place since 1985, when all the SEZs developed in the coastal region went into full 
operation	and	exhibited	lofty	business	success	without	impediment,	and	with	rather	
dynamic tutelage of the central government and regional governments.  As of 2005, 
China holds the second position in the list of the FDI countries and receives a big 
share in Japan’s FDI.  Using archival data, this paper examines the nature and 
causes of Japanese FDI to China and theorizes it with inductive arguments.
China’s Performance in Attracting FDI 
FDI from All Sources: The amount of FDI in China from all sources reached 
from US$1.9 billion in 1986 to US$3.5 billion in 1990, registering an increase 
of about 86 percent in five years.  Other than Hong Kong and Macao, Japan and 
the	USA	were	the	biggest	investor	countries.		Taiwan	Province	emerged	into	the	
spotlight	since	1986	and	soon	assumed	the	position	the	fourth	biggest	investor,	al-
though	its	political	relation	with	the	mainland	was	not	all	through	lukewarm.		The	
Chinese	investors	from	other	Southeast	Asian	countries	assumed	leading	positions.	
From Asia, Singapore and South Korea and from Europe, UK, Germany, France, 
and	 Italy	continued	 to	 invest	at	a	constant	pace,	but	 investment	 from	 these	 four	
European countries remained within the range of 5 to 8 percent of the total inflow. 
Virgin Islands came to the limelight since 1993, progressively increased investment 
throughout the second-half of the 1990s, and led even the USA and Japan in the 
21C with a share of 11 to 12 percent (Nakajima, 2005, pp. 180-1).  Lax tax regimes 
of this region might have enticed the US/UK investments to make a detour to China 
through	Virgin	Islands.	
Transfer of Hong Kong in 1997 and of Macao in 1999, and liberal politics in 
Taiwan	 together	with	 an	 absence	of	 its	 virtual	 embargo	on	 investment	 to	China	
added further to the plight of Taiwanese capital to the mainland.  Japanese FDI 
remained more or less flattened from 1988 to 1992 and increased almost constantly 
from 1993 until 2004.  The fluctuations in 1999 and 2000 cannot be traced to any 
specific changes in its domestic and global investment environments.
World Investment Reports (WIRs) compiled by the UN/UNCTAD show that 
year-to	year	cross-border	investments	in	the	world	have	increased	with	negligible	
fluctuation in the second-half of the1980s; unabatedly throughout the 1990s to a 
record high level of 1.492 trillion in 2000, but fell within the range of $735 to $632 
billion in the first four years of the millennium decade.  China’s average share 
ranged at 2.8 billion (1.9 percent) in the second half of the 1980s, 22.9 billion (9.9 
percent) and 41.9 billion (6.8 percent) respectively in the first and second halves 
of the 1990s, and 53.4 billion (7.9 percent) in the first four years of the 21C.  This 
amounted from 20 to 50 percent of gross FDI flows to all developing countries 
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(except	China),	and	 it	demonstrates	 robustness	of	 the	Chinese	market	as	 invest-
ment destination. The USA throughout the1990s, the UK in 1998, 1999, and 2000 
received more FDI than China (UNCTAD, 2002, p. 283).  In this decade of 21C, as 
investment host, China turned out as the champion over all developing countries/
economies, ASEAN countries, but was bitten by only the USA, Luxembourg (2003 
and 2004), UK (2001, 2002, and 2004) (UNCTAD, 2005, p. 303), and France and 
the Netherlands in 2001 (UNCTAD, 2002, p. 303).  FDI to Hong Kong and Macao, 
which are shown separately in the WIRs, if included as FDI host China will rank 
next to only the USA.  Although its target of $200 billion FDI by 2005 could not 
be unachieved, China has turned out as the single largest FDI recipient among all 
developing countries with an amount of $60.6 billion in 2004 (UNCTAD, 2005, p. 
303).  
FDI from Japan: China’s share in Japan’s FDI in the 1980s was always less 
than 1 percent of its total FDI, except in 1987 when it recorded at 3.7 percent.  The 
aggregate amount of FDI (world) increased almost constantly during the 1990s, 
but decreased in the 2000s.  Investment to China increased to $4.5 billion in 1995, 
which accounted to 8.8 percent of its total FDI of that year, but throughout the 
second half of the 1990s it declined, and reached even to US $751 million or 1.1 
percent in 1999. It rebounded again since 2001 and reached US $4.6 billion or 12.8 
percent of aggregate FDI in 2004.  While in the 1980s Japan’s year-to-year FDI 
amounted	 to	$67.5	billion	 in	1989	as	against	 the	 record	of	$8.9	billion	 in	1981,	
where Asia, including China also, held the biggest share of $3.3 billion or 37.4 
percent	(1981),	which	stood	at	$8.2	billion	in	1989	(JETRO,	various	years).		
	
In this decade, Japan’s total FDI, FDI to Asia as a whole, and FDI to China 
increased.		It	must	be	the	impact	of	Plaza	Accord,	needing	Japan	to	spread	invest-
ment bases to ASEAN, Asian NIEs, and China. Up-and-down in the 1990s show 
no specific pattern, but it registered at $66.7 billion in 1999, where Asia’s share in 
percentage	and	aggregate	constantly	increased,	and	reached	at	the	peak	of	this	de-
cade in 1999, then declined from 2000.  Explosion of economic bubble, malaise in 
the	banking	sector,	and	above	all	corporate	restructuring	led	to	this	tide	and	wave.	
China	increased	its	share	constantly	until	1995,	but	it	fell	constantly	from	1996	to	
2000.  Contrary to the above pattern in the1990s, China increasingly bagged more 
Japanese FDI during 2001-2005.  Japan’s cumulative FDI (from 1951-2004) stood 
at $915.5 billion, where Asia as a whole hosted 17.5 percent, and China 3.4 percent 
or $31.5 billion.  As one country, the USA is the biggest host of Japan’s FDI over 
the UK, the Netherlands, Caiman Island, and Panama, and China holds the sixth 
position	if	countries	in	the	regional	blocs	(NIEs,	ASEAN,	EU15,	and	Oceania)	are	
taken	into	account	separately	(JETRO,	Ibid.).		
Theories of FDI: A Brief Overview
		
FDI theories are indeed extensions of international trade theories, which were 
formulated	to	theorize	the	nature	and	causes	of	international	trade	and	to	logically	
approach	the	issues	and	circumstances	that	condition	the	same.			All	existing	theo-
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ries	enormously	incorporate	elements	from	a	wide	array	of	research	and	practical	
disciplines	of	pure	economics,	development	economics,	international	economics,	
business	 history	 and	management,	 econometrics,	 statistics,	 mathematics,	 public	
administration,	international	business	and	management,	industrial	organization,	in-
dustrial	development	theory,	and	international	development.		Here	some	important	
theories	will	be	introduced	in	a	nutshell.
		
Adam Smith has introduced the “doctrine of absolute advantage” and David 
Richardo, the “doctrine of comparative advantage” in connection with production 
and distribution of goods. The former theory is built on the “scale of economies”, 
and the latter on the “specialization” or efficiency in allocating “limited factors of 
production”	(factor	endowments),	which	lead	to	exchange	of	commodities	amongst	
countries	or	regions.	
					
The theory of Heckscher-Ohlin, also called “factor proportions theory”, on 
the other hand, is founded on the assumption of “uneven distribution of factors of 
production”	among	countries,	but	unlike	Ricardo,	 it	argues	that	manifold	factors	
might exist in a country, and comparative advantage is influenced by the interaction 
among those factors or resources (Krugman and Obstefld, 2002, pp. 66-86).  Trade 
between	countries,	in	other	words,	international	trade	takes	place	due	to	intensity	
in	the	use	of	those	factors	in	which	they	abound.		All	these	theories	are	known	as	
“conventional trade theories”, and these assume a state of perfect competition in 
the	market.		
			
Theories of FDI, in fact, received vital forces from the seminal works of Hymer 
(1976),	which	challenged	the	weaknesses	in	the	assumptions	inherent	in	the	above	
trade theories, and established the fact that firm-specific advantages (strengths) 
generate “intangible” corporate wealth, and create leeway of competition.  FDI, 
in	his	opinion,	takes	place	within	a	state	of	imperfect	market	environment,	and	the	
“firm” or multinational corporations (MNCs) other than the country is the “real ac-
tor”	(Ozawa,	1992)	in	transferring	assets	outside	the	national	boundary.		
		
Krugmen (1983 and 1990) has intertwined “firm-specific variables” and 
“country-specific variables” (factor endowments), which generate transaction cost 
incentives	 through	 integration	of	up-stream	and	down-stream	activities	 (inside	a	
firm and within the country), and movement of MNCs across national boundaries 
arise from unequal factor endowments to reap the benefit of unequal factor prices. 
This theory of Krugman is thus a refinement of his other propositions and theories, 
namely	 the	 theory	of	 intra-industry	and	 the	 theory	of	 technological	competition,	
and	incorporates	elements	from	all	of	them.				
	
Dunning’s (1979 and 1988) “eclectic theory of international production” has 
further enlarged the framework of FDI by MNCs by incorporating the comparative 
factors	 in	both	home-and	host-countries	 in	 that	 three	sets	of	advantages,	namely	
ownership (O) specific advantages, location (L) specific advantages in the home 
or	host	countries,	and	advantages	for	internalization	(I)	from	ownership,	determine	
the	level,	form,	and	extent	of	international	investment	and	distribution,	and	is	called	
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OLI in short. Dunning has classified FDIs into four categories—market seeking, 
resource seeking, asset seeking, and efficiency seeking—according to their objec-
tives.	
	
 Vernon’s “product-life cycle theory” or P-L-C (Vernon 1966, pp. 191-207) 
explains	both	international	trade	and	investment	in	sequential	stages	or	hierarchies	
that	goes	along	with	the	life	cycle	of	a	product.		The	product-life,	as	he	postulates,	
consists of three stages—new product, maturing product, and standardized product. 
At the early stage, since inputs and processing specifications remain unstandard-
ized,	the	product	is	manufactured	in	the	country	of	its	origin	considering	national	
and	other	locational	factors,	and	is	introduced	to	foreign	markets	through	exports.	
With	the	expansion	of	demand	in	the	market,	standardization	drives	the	product	to	
the	maturity	stage	(the	second	stage),	and	price	competition	among	manufacturers	
flares up.  Manufacturing facilities are established, in other words, investments are 
done	in	other	high-income	countries	like	the	USA.		In	the	third	or	more	advanced	
stages	of	standardization,	production	units	shift	to	less-developed	countries	to	take	
competitive	advantage	of	low	cost	and	other	locational	factors,	and	goods	manufac-
tured	there	are	exported	back	to	the	home	country	or	to	other	markets.			
	
	On	 the	 assumption	 of	market	 imperfection,	 Peter	Buckley	 and	Mark	Cas-
son have pioneered the development of the “internalization theory” of FDI, which 
Rugman	(1985)	completed,	and	it	explains	the	process	of	expansion	of	multi-plant	
firms, both domestically and internationally.  For expanding domestically, a firm 
needs	 to	explore	advantages	 (vertical	 integration,	quality	control,	patents,	R&D,	
human	force,	and	so	forth)	inherent	in	them	(internal	factors).	But	in	case	of	inter-
national	expansion,	exploration	of	such	advantages	takes	place	across	the	national	
boundaries.	As	Rugman	(1985)	states,	this	theory	possesses	intimate	relationship	
with Dunning’s “eclectic theory”, which combines ownership, internalization, and 
location-specific advantages into a comprehensive model. The internalization the-
ory combines the first two elements into one set of firm-specific advantage, since 
ownership	advantages	are	internalized	to	make	them	more	effective.		The	country	
or location-specific advantages (transaction cost and environmental factor) as such 
remain the second important determinant of FDI decision.  Both theories are thus 
reconciled	in	essence	and	with	assumptions	(Rugman,	1985).
	
	By	 critically	 observing	 and	 analyzing	 the	most	 successful	 ten	 nations	 that	
have achieved and sustained economic development in recent years, Porter (1990, 
p. 545) has extended the “stages theory of competitive development”.  The coun-
tries	have	achieved	development	in	four	distinct	stages:	factor	driven,	investment	
driven, innovation driven, and wealth driven. The first three of which involve suc-
cessive	upgrading	of	their	competitive	advantages,	but	the	fourth	stage	is	one	of	
drift and ultimately decline.  From this theory, it can be derived that at the micro-
level, a business firm capitalizes on the competitive advantages at macro-levels, i.e. 
the	nation,	and	uses	those	for	international	expansion	and	competition.	The	govern-
ment	plays	a	crucial	role	in	creating	competitive	advantages	of	its	nation	(Porter,	
Ibid.,	 pp.	126-128).	 	Porter	has	 stylized	 the	determinants	of	national	 advantage,	
namely	 factor	 conditions,	 demand	 conditions,	 related	 and	 supporting	 industries,	
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firm strategy, structure, and rivalry are stylized into a diamond shape, and it is 
popularly	called	Porter	Diamond.	Individually	and	collectively,	these	determinants	
create	the	context	in	which	a	nation’s	MNCs	come	into	being,	compete	in	the	home	
market,	and	accumulate	strengths	 to	penetrate	 the	 foreign	markets	 (Porter,	 Ibid.,	
pp. 71-130).   
		
 Aharoni (1966) observed that an individual firm’s geographical horizon (a lo-
cality,	a	sub-national	region,	or	a	home	country)	changes	in	the	course	of	its	growth	
due	to	changes	in	its	internal	and	external	environmental	forces,	and	stimulates	it	to	
“go international”. Aharoni’s proposition resembles Weber’s industrial localization 
theory,	which	is	one	of	the	earliest	researches	that	examined	the	concentration	of	
factories	in	industrial	enclaves	to	reduce	the	burden	of	population	migration	to	large	
urban	cities.	Weber	emphasized	the	need	to	minimize	the	total	cost	of	transporting	
raw materials to the factory and of final manufactures to the market by locating 
industries	in	the	close	proximity	of	markets.	Originally	if	the	cost	of	production,	in-
cluding transportation cost of final products, is higher than the cost of final product, 
including	the	transportation	cost	of	raw	materials,	the	factory	should	be	established	
in	the	proximity	of	its	market,	and	vice	versa.		Cost	of	production,	in	addition	to	
raw	material	cost,	includes	labor	cost,	can	be	minimized	by	locating	industries	to	
low labor-cost regions in other countries (Suzuki, 2001, pp. 134-145). These geo-
business	models	give	a	comprehensive	framework	of	explaining	and	pinpointing	
all international business actions of any firm, and not only of MNCs. Three set of 
variables,	namely	conditioning	variables,	motivation	variables,	 and	control	vari-
ables greatly influence the locational aspect of a firm, and interactions among these 
variables entice or discourage firms to take businesses across national boundaries. 
National	policies	of	economic	development,	through	import-substitution	or	export-
oriented industrialization, historically created a wide array of physical and fiscal 
facilities	(factors)	through	the	establishment	of	developmental	enclaves	with	diver-
sified incentive offer to MNCs, non-MNCs, and domestic enterprise.
					
        Political approaches of FDI include political and power aspects underlying 
FDI, and most importantly, they emphasize how changes of world political blocs 
pose impact on FDI flows. Gilpin (1975, p.19) argues that international political 
orders	created	by	dominant	nations	(core	country)	for	security	interests	provide	a	
favorable	environment	of	economic	 interdependence	and	corporate	expansion	 in	
other countries (periphery).  Known as “core-periphery model”, it is a dominant 
power that assumes the “core” position and sends goods and investments to coun-
tries dependent on it or adjacent to its power of business and economic activities, 
“the periphery”. Pax Britannica and Pax Americana are two most important struc-
tures, the former explains UK’s position in the pre-war period, and the latter, the US 
position	in	the	post-WW	II	period	(Gilpin,	Ibid.).
	
						Marxist,	and	even	many	non-Marxists,	economist	view	the	relationship	between	
partners in P-L-C as “hierarchical and exploitative”. In other words, they view that 
growth and development outcomes instead of flowing to the lesser developed pe-
riphery move in reverse direction, that is, from the “global, underdeveloped periph-
ery to the centers of industrial financial power and decision” (Gilpin, Ibid.), which 
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as	such	makes	the	periphery	more	dependent	on	the	core.
		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 In	order	 to	describe	 the	movement	of	goods	and	 investments	among	mar-
kets	during	the	situation	of	unbalanced	growth,	Akamatsu	(1961)	has	extended	the	
“geese-flying pattern (G-F-P)”. According to the G-F-P, products, firms, technolo-
gies,	 investments,	 and	 ultimately	 countries	move	 among	 locations	 in	 search	 for	
market	opportunities,	forming	a	pattern	of	wild-geese	that	migrate	to	comfortable	
locations in different seasons of the year. Products, firms, and so forth are analogous 
to	the	geese	seeking	safe	nests.	This	model	is	vividly	referred	to	while	explaining	
economic	growth	in	Japan	and	Asian	fast	growth	economies.		
	
       On the theoretical and practical premises of this G-F-P, Kojima (1975) has 
extended “macro-economic theory” of FDI with two propositions—one based on 
the	classical	Richardian	doctrine	of	comparative	advantages,	and	the	other	on	his	
own classification of “mutually beneficial type of FDI”.  The core concept of this 
model	is	that	countries	in	trade	gain	more	from	a	situation	of	immobility	of	factors	
through FDI, provided that such FDI goes from the “disadvantaged sectors” of the 
home country to the” advantaged sectors” of the host country (Kojima and Ozawa, 
1984, pp. 1-20).  
		
        Fayerweather (1969) argues that a firm can transfer its management resources, 
superior	skills	of	product,	process,	 information,	technology,	and	management,	in	
package with FDI, and using that can create competitive advantages for it in other 
countries, and is called “management technology transfer theory” of FDI (Yama-
mura, 2001, pp. 39-40). 
		
							Theses,	anti-theses,	and	syntheses	prevail	in	plenty,	some	come	and	some	go	
with or without notice, and it can be concluded in line with Koontz (1961) that FDI 
theories can perfectly be interwoven into “FDI Theory Jungle” comprising of in-
numerable	full-or	sub-	approaches	or	models.	All	have	uniqueness	and	originality	
in some forms or others, and apply validly to explain the nature and causes of FDI 
and	operations	of	MNCs.		
Theoretical Outlook Of Japanese FDI To China
	
Increasing Japanese FDI to China is indeed a functional outcome of two divergent 
sets	of	factors,	push	and	pull,	in	that	the	former	composed	of	historical	and	neo-fac-
tors	in	Japan	pushes	MNCs	to	extend	networks	to	China,	and	the	latter	composed	
of country and market specific advantages in China pulls MNCs investments into 
it.		This	situation	can	be	explained	with	references	to	existing	researches	and	from	
logical inductions from facts to frame a hybrid theory of Japanese FDI in China.
Country-Specific Competitive Advantages Available, Cre-
ated, and Promoted in China
	
							 Japanese FDI surged to China, as was seen, at first in the aftermath of yen ap-
preciation in the second half of the 1980s, and secondly since 1993.  High growth 
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of	the	Chinese	economy	as	the	result	of	economic	reform	and	market	liberalization	
and	recognition	of	the	same	by	other	nations	induced	Japanese	MNCs	to	incorpo-
rate China into their regional production and market networks to reap the benefit of 
its	national	endowments	in	labour,	consumer	market,	and	its	nurtured	competitive	
advantages toward catching-up with the developed countries.  Japanese FDI was 
not absolutely resource-or-asset seeking, rather market-and-efficiency seeking to 
serve the Chinese domestic market in the first instance and then home market, and 
to maximize overall corporate efficiency and performance thereby.
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Asian	currency	crisis	and	increase	of	labour	costs	in	Singapore,	Malaysia,	
and	Thailand	induced	most	MNCs	to	relocate	plants,	and	divert	new	investments	
to China. Sikorski and Mennkhoff (2000) regarded this trend as revolving of FDI 
within the region in response to its transforming comparative advantages.  Zhou 
and Lall (2005) found that China does not crowd out FDI to other countries; rather 
its	industrial	capabilities	in	skills,	technology	levels,	supplier	bases,	infrastructure,	
and	its	large	market	size	allow	MNCs	to	reap	scale	and	scope	of	economies	more	
competitively	than	in	other	countries	in	the	region.
	
External	 orientation	 of	 development	 strategies	 that	 emerged	 from	 its	 mar-
ket reforms and growth of efficient human capital and social concessions in the 
economically advanced provinces added new forces to attracting FDI.  The Gov-
ernment	of	China	explicitly	directed	its	liberalization	and	marketization	policy	to	
promote	the	development	of	the	southeastern	coastal	provinces,	and	to	divert	that	
toward	the	northwestern	provinces.	As	is	evident	in	the	Western	Region	Develop-
ment	Program	of	the	Government,	this	spatial	dimension	of	development	has	put	
emphasis	on	infrastructure	development,	such	as	the	upgrading	of	human	capital	
through	education,	and	inward	migration	of	needful	human	force,	which	was	very	
similar	in	the	development	policy	of	the	coastal	provinces.			
		
International	pressure,	from	the	US	in	particular,		to	revise	the	existing	mon-
etary	and	banking	systems	to	strengthen	the	undervalued,	and	thus	highly	competi-
tive	renminbi,	and	to	reform	the	operation	of	the	commercial	banks	(Daily	Yomiuri,	
2005, p. 4) will strengthen China’s advantage.  China’s national industry localiza-
tion	policy	to	pool	industries	in	different	regions	based	on	different	natural	endow-
ments	and	development	levels,	is	quite	akin	to	the	historical	strategy	of	polarizing	
growth	activities	in	designated	centers	in	market	economies.					
					
From 1999, the Chinese government has removed restrictions, liberalized 
regimes	 and	 administrative	mechanisms,	 and	 above	 all	 abolished	 restrictions	 to	
foreign entry (FDI) in some industries and sectors. It also initiated new bilateral 
investment	treaties	(BITs)	and	double	taxation	treaties	(DTTs)	with	many	countries	
and to specifically earmarked industries.  Other measures included enhancing guar-
antees	on	 the	protection	of	 intellectual	 property	 right	 and	 against	 expropriation,	
changes	in	legislation,	environment	aspects,	and	accounting	and	audit.		As	China’s	
bid to access into the World Trade Organization (WTO) was at the final phase, it 
removed	most	tariff	and	non-tariff	barriers	and	embargo	on	local	contents	in	the	
final manufactures, technology transfer, and local R&D (UNCTAD, 2002, pp. 54-
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5).  Further liberalization was introduced to the services sector, especially financial 
services,	distribution	(wholesale,	retail,	franchising),	media,	education,	with	more	
incentives	and	opportunities	to	establish	R&D	centers,	regional	HQs,	and	reform	
SOEs.  It signed agreement with ASEAN to establish free-trade area by 2010. As 
the	consequences	of	 embracing	market	mechanisms	and	adding	new	and	 liberal	
elements in its National Economic and Social Development Plan of 2005, China’s 
market	imperfections	in	the	yardstick	of	market	economies	in	the	West	took	a	new	
shift	to	more	perfection.					
Domestic Forces Inducing Japanese MNCs to Invest in China
			
Japan	lost	its	colonies	in	China	and	other	Asian	countries	in	WW	II,	entered	
into	peace	treaty	with	the	USA,	was	looked	after	by	the	GHQ,	and	virtually	en-
tered	under	the	umbrella	of	Pax	Americana.		Although	not	recognized	in	the	po-
litical	development	history,	 it	was	 indeed	demise	of	 the	Pax	Japonica.	However,	
Japan gained free access to the US product and investment markets under a fixed 
exchange rate agreement of US$1 to 360 yen.  From the 1970s onwards, Japan 
constantly	maintained	a	positive	trade	balances	with	the	USA	and	most	of	the	de-
veloped	nations.		Negative	trade	balances	of	trade	with	the	USA	gave	rise	to	severe	
trade	 frictions,	 and	 the	Plaza	Agreement	of	1985	 resulted	 in	 the	appreciation	of	
Yen against US dollar and other major currencies. Japan firms had to look for new 
manufacturing	bases	 in	 countries	 possessing	 relatively	 cozy	business	 and	diplo-
matic	relationship	with	the	West,	and	especially	the	USA.		These	coincided	with	
the	import	substitution-cum-export	oriented	trade	policies	adopted	by	the	NIEs	and	
ASEAN countries since the 1970s, all of which are endowed with surplus labours 
and	huge	untapped	primary	 resources	and	offered	 infrastructure	 facilities	by	es-
tablishing industrial enclaves, namely IEs, FTZs, LMWs, IPs, and with lucrative 
financial and fiscal incentives.  Japan entered into bilateral and regional trade and 
investment	agreements	with	these	countries,	which	further	enhanced	factors	mobil-
ity	from	Japan,	and	its	cultural	similarity	with	ethnic	Chinese	population	segments	
in	those	countries	eased	MNCs	movement	within	this	region,	and	ultimately	has	
paved	the	way	to	penetrate	the	Chinese	market.	
Regional Competitiveness of China
		
UNCTAD’s 2005 Survey of FDI Prospects for 2005-2008 revealed that in-
ternational FDI experts and TNCs rank China (85 percent) as the best global busi-
ness	location	among	such	top	ten	countries,	including	the	USA	(55	percent),	India	
(42 percent), Brazil, Russian Federation, the UK, Germany, Poland, and Ukraine. 
TNCs	(87	percent)	in	this	survey	ranked	it	as	the	best	location	over	India,	the	USA,	
Russian Federation, Brazil, Mexico, Germany, the UK, and Canada (UNCTAD, 
2005, pp. 33-5).  China is found to adopt greater investment targets, strengthen 
investment	 policies,	 offer	 additional	 incentive	 packages,	 introduce	 further	 liber-
alization,	and	adopt	promotional	measures.		Among	its	Asian	counterparts,	albeit	
with	much	lower	points,	India,	Singapore,	and	Thailand	were	on	the	list.		China’s	
national	 advantages	 are	more	 promising	 than	 those	 available	 at	 other	 Southeast	
Asian	countries,	and	it	is	adding	more	forces	to	those	by	introducing	pro-invest-
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ment legal and market measures.  Liberalization of FDI in banking and financial 
sectors has improved its competitive edge (UNCTAD, 2005). 
				
Surveys	on	overseas	business	operations	of	Japanese	manufacturing	compa-
nies	by	the	defunct	Japan	Bank	for	International	Cooperation	(JBIC)	showed	China	
as the most promising location for investment and business operation for five con-
secutive years from 2001-2005.  The Survey in 2005 found that 71.2 percent of the 
respondents	 favor	China	 as	 the	most	promising	 location	 for	business	promotion	
over Russia and other CIS, Central and Eastern Europe, other Asian Countries/ 
Oceania,	and	North	America.	With	China	at	the	top,	other	Asian	favorites	are	India,	
Thailand,	and	Vietnam.		Although	the	stance	toward	China	has	declined	compared	
with the previous year, FDI in China is aimed to increase sales in the domestic 
market	and	in	ASEAN	and	to	reduce	sales	in	Japan.		Respondents	view	only	limited	
impact	of	anti-Japanese	demonstration	on	 their	operations	 in	China.	 	Production	
bases	in	China	manufacture	general-purpose	products	and	will	shift	to	high-value-
added products (JBIC, 2005).    
Responding	 companies	 attached	 high	 priority	 to	 China	 and	 India	 as	 more	
potential	markets	over	 the	EU-member	countries	due	 to	geographical	proximity,	
which facilitate easy access to both production bases and final markets.  In terms 
of industrial category, electrical equipment and electronics or E&E (41.0 percent) 
and general machinery (23.3 percent) show relatively higher tendency to produce 
and	sale	in	the	same	bases.	The	automobile	makers	are	more	prone	to	produce	near	
the	market,	but	E&E	companies	are	keen	to	move	production	to	low-cost	overseas	
sites	to	meet	the	need	of	short	product	cycle	and	pressure	of	cost	reduction	(JBIC,	
Ibid,	p.	8).			
	
Within	China,	all	MNCs	irrespective	of	industrial	categories	intend	to	strength-
en	and	expand	their	operations	in	Eastern	and	Southern	regions,	E&E	manufactur-
ers	also	in	the	same	regions,	but	automobile	makers	favor	Southern	regions	(59.7	
percent) over Eastern regions (44.1 percent), which might be due again to affluent 
regional markets, easy access to affluent Hong Kong and Macao, and facility of 
exporting	to	other	countries.		Since	industrial	accumulations	in	China	takes	place	
corresponding	to	expansion	of	operations	by	Japanese	automakers,	more	compa-
nies prefer Southern regions to other regions (JBIC, Ibid.).  Functional cluster-
ing	shows	a	strong	 tendency	 to	 locate	production	functions	 in	Southern	regions,	
distribution	 functions	 in	Northeastern	 regions,	 and	 regional	 control	 functions	 in	
Northern	and	Southern	regions.		This	corresponds	with	the	status	of	development	
at	sub-national	levels	in	this	country.		Japanese	manufacturers	are	more	interested	
in	increasing	revenues	and	earnings	through	reinforcing	business	operations	in	the	
emerging	sub-national	markets.		
The Perceived Theory Of Japanese FDI In China 
Huge	research	literatures	explain	theoretically	and	empirically	the	underlying	
reasons	of	success	of	 the	Asia’s	high	growth	economies,	and	regard	them	as	 the	
world’s	 growth	 pole	 that	 create	 and	 emit	 forces	 to	 foster	 development	 support-
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ive	environment	for	the	rest	of	the	global	economy.		China	witnessed	a	dramatic	
growth at the average rate of about 10 percent in the 1980s, more than 10.3 percent 
in 1990s, and more than 9 percent in the year 2000. Max Weber’s cultural con-
figurations of Confucianism that propels economic development has been widely 
attributed	to	by	many	development	economists	and	historians	while	explaining	de-
velopment	in	Asian	NIEs.	Confucianism,	which	forms	the	foundation	of	Chinese	
societal	interactions	and	work	ethics,	has	historically	modeled	the	economic	devel-
opmental environment of this nation (Chen, 1989, p. 63).  China’s state sponsored 
socialist policies, moreover, was always development oriented and “economic” 
development	 supportive,	 either	with	or	without	 courting	capitalistic	modus	ope-
randi,	and	welfare	oriented.		Its	government	can	be	admired	as	pro-development	or	
“conducive autocratic” and has ensured a stable environment for investment, mod-
ernization, and socio-economic transition.  FDI is regarded as a solid substitute for 
Confucian culture (Chen, Ibid, pp. 63-70).  China’s Open Door Policy was, indeed, 
a	 rational	 and	 robust	 challenge	 towards	 courting	 the	 western	 market-economy	
fundamentals, and a realistic “demonstration” of the advanced Asian neighbors. 
Buckley, Clegg, Wang, and Cross (2002, pp. 1-28) viewed FDI as one of the most 
palpable outcomes of the same policy, which has also bolstered FDI and foreign 
firms’ activities in the economically strong provinces.   
				
The G-F-P model of Akamatsu does not optimally explain China’s develop-
ment or its FDI harvesting. Chen  observes the matter as follows:     “China is not 
a goose but some other huge bird flying side by side with the geese.  China has the 
potential	of	complementing	and	competing	with	 the	various	 layers	(author	adds,	
raw materials, product, technology, industry, country) of the flying geese at various 
levels	of	industrial	production.		In	some	areas,	China	is	competing	or	potentially	
could	compete	with	Japan	and	the	NICs.	------China	is	also	producing	downstream	
labour-intensive products in competition with ASEAN-4” (1989, pp. 70-71).  
						
This locational phenomenon of Japanese MNCs production bases in NIEs/ 
ASEAN,	 and	 in	 the	 next	 phase,	 from	NIEs	 to	ASEAN	 seem	 somewhat	 akin	 to	
the propositions in Vernon’s P-L-C and Akamatsu’s G-F-P models of economic 
development.		Japan,	however,	did	more	investment	in	USA	and	Europe,	and	only	
recently	invests	in	big	amounts	to	China.		Most	of	the	Japanese	MNCs	did	not	de-
velop	new	products,	nor	did	introduce	new	products	to	the	developed	country	mar-
kets other than their own one.  It can thus be argued that P-L-C and G-F-P models 
fail to explain fully the movement Japanese FDI or MNCs to China.  
					
The country-specific factors and conditions in China can be fairly accom-
modated in Porter’s diamond model and country-specific advantages in Rugmen’s 
theory,	as	was	mentioned	earlier.	The	government	maneuvers	trickily	and	wittily	
to nurture, multiply, and refurbish its country-specific advantages, which can be 
attributed to as “pull factors”. Traditional push factors in Japan, such as, high la-
bour	costs,	lose	of	viability	by	low-tech,	light	industries	at	home	are	of	paramount	
importance,	but	Japanese	MNCs	aim	to	reap	advantages	inherent	in	China’s	market	
structure	and	also	those	arising	out	of	its	rapidly	transforming	social-market	envi-
ronments, which can be attributed to as “neo-push factors”, propelling their invest-
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ment	into	the	Chinese	market.
					
The	fact	that,	Japanese	MNCs	attach	importance	to	China	over	other	distantly	
located countries and to the affluent sub-regions within China, further leads to infer 
that P-L-C and geo-business models explain some Japanese MNCs’ FDI to China. 
While Toyota and other major automobile makers have established their opera-
tions	in	China	with	R&D	facilities,	Sanyo,	Matsushita,	Hitachi,	Toshiba,	and	many	
other	small	and	non-reputed	E&E	makers	have	done	the	same,	where	the	demand	
for household appliances, electronics goods, and low price fuel efficient private 
vehicles	are	increasing	at	galloping	rates.		This	implies	that	companies	are	more	
in	search	of	lucrative	markets	in	China,	the	geographical	factors	and	other	factor	
endowments	more	important	to	them,	and	the	stages	of	products	are	illusory	or	less	
visible.		Proximity	of	China’s	Eastern	and	Southern	regions	to	Japan	further	sup-
ports	this	argument.
Japanese FDI flowed to China due to its MNCs effort to divert their firm-spe-
cific competitive advantages (superior HRM techniques, TQM, JIT and kanban) to 
the	culturally	akin	(cultural	advantage)	and	geographically	close	(market	proxim-
ity)	huge	markets	in	China.	As	found,	local	competitors	are	less	equipped	in	terms	
of	management,	technology,	QC	control,	market	promotion,	and	distribution	than	
their	Japanese	counterparts,	but	Japanese	MNCs	possess	the	same	competitive	rela-
tions among them as it is in the home country. Thus, it is seen that Fayerweather’s 
proposition of “transfer of management resources” better explains FDI by Japanese 
MNCs,	in	that,	they	transfer	their	more	advanced	management	resources	to	China	
to seek its country-specific advantages (Yamamura, 2001, pp.36-40).  China caught 
those FDI with diligent and wit.  China’s reform policies and market oriented de-
velopment programs created and nurtured its country-specific advantages. Japan, 
however,	 is	a	 late	entrant	 to	automobile	and	other	star-product	sectors	 in	China,	
and is outdone by German, the USA, France, and Asian rivals from South Korea, 
Singapore,	and	Taiwan	in	some	cases.		
Concluding Remark
Thus	what	emerges	broadly	from	this	study	is	that,	a	single	existing	model	is	
not sufficient to theorize Japanese FDI to China, rather a host of theories or models 
explain the different aspects of Japanese MNCs’ practices/ FDI in this country. 
While	more	empirical	research,	using	statistical	and	econometric	models,	is	needed	
to theorize and support findings of this research, in its status quo it can be called a 
Japanese FDI a la China model.  It incorporates elements from many theories, as 
mentioned above, to explain the scenarios surrounding Japanese FDI in China.
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